Abstract-We use a tailor-made survey on a Swedish sample to investigate how individuals' relative income affects their demand for redistribution. We first document that a majority misperceive their position in the income distribution and believe that they are poorer, relative to others, than they actually are. We then inform a subsample about their true relative income and find that individuals who are richer than they initially thought demand less redistribution. This result is driven by individuals with prior right-ofcenter political preferences who view taxes as distortive and believe that effort, rather than luck, drives individual economic success.
I. Introduction

M
OST governments redistribute economic resources among citizens, and policies with redistributive components have become increasingly important in recent years (Alesina, di Tella, & MacCulloch, 2004) . However, the extent to which income and wealth are redistributed varies across countries, and the academic struggle to understand individual preferences for redistribution has been ongoing for decades. As many countries witness increasing inequality, questions about how preferences for redistribution form and change are likely to remain at the core of both the public and the academic debate.
Theoretical models of how preferences for redistribution are formed often include relative income or wealth as a key element. In seminal theoretical contributions, Romer (1975) and Meltzer and Richard (1981) suggest that as a relatively richer person benefits less from redistribution in monetary terms, she should demand less of it. An implicit assumption in these and other models aiming to explain individual preferences for redistribution is that people hold correct information about their position in the income distribution. However, the validity of this assumption is often rejected empirically (see, e.g., Cruces, Perez-Truglia, & Tetaz, 2013) .
We conduct an experiment on a Swedish sample. Our data consist of answers from two tailor-made surveys linked to individual administrative records containing information on income, wealth, education, civil status, government transfers, and cognitive ability. To our knowledge, papers that address this type of question have never before had access to such a rich set of information.
We use the first survey to assess if Swedes perceive their position in the income distribution correctly. We find that 86% of the respondents believe that they are poorer, relative to others, than they actually are, while only 13% overestimate their position. The average respondent underestimates her position by 16 percentiles. In addition, we use the administrative data to investigate heterogeneities in the documented misperceptions and find that more educated and more cognitively able people who consume more media and individuals who recently experienced upward income mobility hold beliefs that are significantly more accurate.
The second survey was distributed three months after the first and is a randomized experiment where half of the respondents were treated with personalized information about their true relative position in the income distribution. The second survey also elicited preferences for redistribution, party preferences, and opinions on taxation from both treated and untreated respondents.
We find that informing individuals that they have a higher relative income than they thought makes them demand less redistribution and express more support for the Conservative Party. The effect is large: the demand for redistribution falls by 22.8% relative to the control group mean. This effect is driven by the subset of respondents who expressed right-of-center political preferences pretreatment (i.e., in the first survey). While they respond to the positive relative income news by moving even further to the right on the political spectrum, individuals who did not express rightof-center sympathies in the first survey are not affected at all by the information treatment. We find that two sets of beliefs about how the economy works can explain much of the heterogeneous response: those with political preferences right-of-center tend to believe that effort, rather than luck, is the main determinant behind individual economic success and that redistribution is distortive in the sense that income taxes have an impact an labor supply. Economic and demographic differences between the right and the left cannot explain the heterogeneous treatment response, although such differences certainly exist.
Our paper relates to the vast literature that seeks to understand how individual preferences for redistribution are formed. The theoretical predictions about relatively richer individuals wanting less redistribution, originally proposed by Romer (1975) and Meltzer and Richard (1981) , have found empirical support in, for instance, Alesina and Giuliano (2010) , but have also been scrutinized and challenged. For example, individuals have been found to deviate from pure self-interest in caring also about the 202 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS consumption of others (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000) . Such other-regarding preferences tend to correlate positively with the demand for redistribution (Fong, 2001; Alesina & Giuliano, 2010) . Beliefs about the income-generating process have also been studied theoretically (Piketty, 1995; Benabou & Tirole, 2006) , and beliefs about the extent to which individuals' economic success can be attributed to effort rather than to luck have been found to be a stronger empirical determinant of preferences for redistribution than income itself (Fong, 2001) .
Understanding the role that income, or perceptions of income, play for political preferences is made more difficult by the fact that other underlying variables may also cause a correlation between income and political preferences. For example, Mollerstrom and Seim (2014) find that high-IQ individuals favor less redistribution, which could reflect that high-ability individuals, who more easily succeed and tend to have higher earnings, lean toward a more individualistic, right-wing view of the world. In general, existing evidence on the impact of income on political preferences is mixed. Although many studies provide results supporting self-interested political preferences and pocketbook voting (Peltzman, 1985; Margalit, 2013; Durante, Putterman, & van der Weele, 2014; Powdthavee & Oswald, 2014; Elinder, Jordahl, & Poutvaara, 2015) , evidence for socially motivated political preferences has also been documented (see, e.g., Sears & Funk, 1990) . We contribute to this literature by correcting misperceptions of respondents' relative income, yielding identified estimates of causal effects with credible external validity.
Furthermore, we contribute to a nascent literature that addresses misperceptions of relative income. Using an Argentinian sample, Cruces et al. (2013) find that individuals are wrong about their own position in the income distribution, but that there is no systematic under-or overreporting of relative income. The same has been found using data from Spain (Fernández-Albertos & Kuo, 2015) and Germany (Engelhardt & Wagener, 2016) . Using U.S. data, Chambers, Swan, and Heesacker (2014) find that individuals tend to underestimate average income. In line with the findings we present, Grigorieff and Roth (2016) find that Americans tend to underestimate their relative income.
A shortcoming of these papers is that differences between perceived and actual income ranks may be due to deviations of self-reported income from actual income rather than incorrect beliefs about the income distribution. By using administrative data on annual income, our research design disentangles those two mechanisms. We show that misreporting of actual income is small compared to misreporting of relative income, suggesting that the validity of results obtained in similar settings where the data are not as rich may still be high.
Given the presence of biased beliefs, it is natural to ask how individuals react to receiving correct information. The existing research provides mixed results. Cruces et al. (2013) show that respondents who overestimated their relative income prior to treatment increase their demand for redistribution, while there is no statistically significant treatment effect for those who underestimated their rank. Engelhardt and Wagener (2016) find no significant effects on political preferences from revealing correct information, while Fernández-Albertos and Kuo (2015) report statistically significant effects only for the bottom of the income distribution. Kuziemko et al. (2015) find that even though providing information about taxes and the distributions of income and wealth affects views on whether inequality is an important problem, the effects on policy views and demand for redistribution are small. Similarly, Zilinsky (2014) finds that subjects who are exposed to information about U.S. inequality are not, on average, more willing to take specific action, such as supporting higher taxes, to increase equality.
Our results are also related to theoretical work on the selfreinforcing relationships among personal income, beliefs, and political preferences, which have been proposed by Piketty (1995) , Alesina and Angeletos (2005) , and Benabou and Tirole (2006) . For example, in Piketty (1995) , agents with different prior beliefs about the role of effort for economic success tend to diverge in terms of incomes, political preferences, and posterior beliefs because of a limited updating process. Our finding that, in particular, individuals with right-wing preferences decrease their demand for redistribution when faced with positive news about their relative income is consistent with this framework. The self-reinforcing nature of the relationship among income, voting, and beliefs is corroborated by another of our results: right-of-center individuals are more likely to believe in the importance of effort in the first survey, and treatment strengthens these beliefs even further.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes our experiment and the resulting data. In section III, we document the results from the first survey and describe the bias in beliefs about the relative position in the income distribution held by the respondents. Section IV describes the second survey and the outcome of the experiment. Section V concludes.
II. Data
The surveys used in this study, which we designed, were implemented by Statistics Sweden. Conducting the study in collaboration with Statistics Sweden, which collects and handles official data in Sweden, allowed us to link survey data to administrative records.
A. The First Survey and Administrative Data
The first survey was sent by postal mail to a representative sample of 4,500 Swedish citizens above 18 years of age in May 2011. Respondents were asked to report their annual income from the previous year (2010) and to state their perceived position in the national income distribution by answering the following question: "How many percent of the Swedish population (18 years or older) do you think RICHER (AND HOLIER) THAN THOU? 203 have a total annual income which is lower than yours?" Total annual income was explicitly defined as the sum of labor and capital income before taxes, including pensions but exclusive of transfers such as unemployment insurance. In addition, respondents were asked to state what they believed the mean annual income in Sweden was in 2010. 1 The first survey also asked respondents to report how often (0 = never, 1 = every month, 2 = every week, and 3 = every day) they use various sources of information, with the alternatives being printed newspapers, news on radio/TV, magazines, other radio/TV programs, and news online. We define the variable Informed as the sum of the answers pertaining to each medium, so that a higher value of this variable indicates more extensive media usage.
In addition, the first survey elicited political party preferences, and beliefs about how distortive income taxes are and how individual economic success comes about.
There are nine main political parties in Sweden. Preferences for these were elicited by asking respondents to state the party that they would vote for if there were to be an election at the time when the respondent filled out the survey. 2 We use this information to define an indicator of left-right preferences. The binary variable Right assumes the value 1 if the respondent stated an intention to vote for one of the four Swedish right-of-center parties and 0 otherwise. 3 We capture respondents' beliefs about the distortive effects of redistribution gauging agreement with the following statement: "Changes in income taxes influence how much individuals choose to work." The binary variable No Distort takes the value of 1 for respondents who reported an agreement to the statement of 5 or lower on a 1 to 10 scale (where 10 indicated complete agreement with the statement).
The following question was used to elicit beliefs about how individual economic success comes about: "Is it mostly effort or luck that matters for how well an individual does economically in life?" Respondents were asked to indicate their answer on a scale of 1 to 10 where 1 was defined as "only luck" and 10 as "only effort," and we let the binary indicator Luck assume the value 1 for answers below 6. If economic success is realized through effort, redistribution can be argued to be more distortive (Fong, 2001 ) and we use 1 All survey questions, in the order they were presented to participants, are available in the online appendix.
2 The respondents also had the option to state that they did not know or did not want to answer, that they would cast a blank vote, or that they would abstain from voting.
3 As discussed in section IVC and shown in the online appendix, our specifications are robust to alternative definitions of this variable, including one where those who abstain from voting, cast blank votes, decline to answer, or vote for nontraditional parties are excluded from the analysis. Details about the left-right scale in Swedish politics can be found in Petersson (1994) , Pettersson-Lidbom (2008) , and Oscarsson and Holmberg, 2013 (see also Alesina et al., 1997, 4 A total of 1,562 individuals responded to the first survey. This corresponds to a response rate of 36%, which is in line with other postal mail surveys of similar length carried out by Statistics Sweden.
To implement the randomized experiment in the second survey, reported data on annual income and perceived relative income were required. Thus, we excluded respondents who abstained from answering these questions. We also excluded respondents who stated that they were located above what they believe to be mean income but, at the same time, below the median income, as well as respondents where the difference between self-reported and annual income according to administrative registers for 2010 was so large that the respondent probably did not correctly understand the question and, for example, reported monthly instead of annual income. 5 After these exclusions, we had 1,242 respondents in the sample.
The survey responses were linked to national administrative records at the individual level, mainly from the longitudinal integration database for health insurance and labor market studies (Swedish acronym LISA). LISA comprises information on age, education, civil status, number of children, home region, and government transfers such as unemployment insurance and social security benefits. In addition, the data were complemented by annual taxable income for the years 1999 to 2010 and by data on real estate and financial wealth for the year 2006 from the Income and Tax register. 6 Finally, for a subset of men born after 1950 and before 1981, we retrieve test scores for cognitive ability from the Swedish Military Records. 7 Until 1999, military enlistment was mandatory for all Swedish men. The enlistment normally took place in the year a man turned 18 or 19 and encompassed a test of cognitive ability. This test consisted of four sections assessing logical ability, verbal ability, technological comprehension, and metal folding, comprising forty questions each, and is an accepted measure of intelligence (Carlstedt, 2000; Heckman, Stixrud & Urzua, 2006;  4 The index is computed by first subtracting the control group mean from each observation and then dividing by the control group standard deviation. Any missing values of the variables in the index are ignored when taking the mean to form the index. 5 Our results are robust to ignoring the last two exclusion criteria. They are also robust to wide variations in the allowed divergence between stated and administratively reported income. In the specifications reported here, we allowed for a maximum difference between stated and administratively reported income of 750%.
6 Administrative data on wealth exist because Sweden used to tax wealth. When the tax was repealed, in 2007, the Tax Agency ceased collecting these data.
7 There are men in our sample born before 1951, but for these cohorts, military enlistment data are not available in digitized form. Lindqvist & Westman, 2012) . The combined score is converted into a scale of 1 to 9, and we let the dummy variable IQ assume the value 1 for values of cognitive ability above the sample median.
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The first survey also contained questions regarding income mobility. We asked respondents about their own mobility through questions where we asked them to state their relative position in the income distribution ten years ago and ten years into the future. By combining these with their perceived current position, we define the variables Subjective Relative Income Growth (past position minus current position) and Subjective Future Relative Income Growth (future position minus current position). The first survey also elicited respondents' opinions about income mobility in general through the following question: "If one is born in a certain income group, one will probably not end up in another income group in the future." Respondents were asked to agree or disagree with this statement on a 1-to-10 scale, where 10 incidates complete agreement. 8
B. Design of the Experiment and the Second Survey
In August 2011, three months after the first survey, a second survey was sent to those who responded to the first. Half of the second-round recipients were randomly selected to receive a treatment revealing their actual position in the income distribution.
The income distribution of the full Swedish population was calculated using administrative data. However, we used the self-reported income from the first survey to locate each individual's percentile to avoid the variation that would stem from informing some subjects about both their absolute and their relative income. This procedure also makes our results comparable to previous studies, such as Cruces et al. (2013) , which do not have access to administrative records.
As expected, administrative and self-reported income are highly correlated. In figure 1 , we compute the bias in reported income as the difference between reported and administrative income, divided by administrative income. The distribution is centered around 0 and indicates that our respondents do not hold biased beliefs about their own absolute income. This result is important for understanding our treatment, as it shows that bias does not stem from misreported actual incomes. While the mean perception of relative income is understimated by 16 percentiles, income levels are not significantly misreported on average ( p = 0.19). 9 Information about the respondents' true relative position in the income distribution was provided to the treatment The figure displays the distribution of erroneous annual income reports. Bias is defined as the 100 × (reported income − administrative data income)/administrative-data income. We drop twenty observations with administrative data income of 0, leaving the number of observations at 1,222.
group using a scale reprinted in figure 2. The explanation entails a horizontal line with numbers representing income deciles. For each decile, the actual median annual income in 2010 was stated. A marker indicated where in the distribution the respondent's income was located. The following information was provided: "In the previous survey, you reported an annual income for 2010 of [X] SEK. In the figure below we have indicated where your income is located on the income scale." 10 To ensure that respondents considered the information, this statement was immediately followed by a question asking individuals to categorize themselves as being in either one of the five lowest or one of the five highest deciles. 11 The treatment is relatively subtle as we do not explicitly compare an individual's actual position on the income scale with the beliefs stated in the first survey. This, together with the time lag between the two surveys, reduces the likelihood that our results are due to the framing effect that could arise if subjects were told that they were "wrong" or "right" in the first survey. After the information treatment and the simple follow-up question, the second survey was identical for both groups.
We use three outcome variables to study the effect of treatment on individuals' preferences. The first is a question about the demand for redistribution by means of economic policies, where subjects indicate their preferred level of income redistribution. The scale has 10 steps, with 1 being defined as no redistribution (meaning that the government does not influence the income distribution at all) and 10 
-Treatment Design
Before you answer the questions we want to inform you about the following:
Imagine that we group all Swedes into 10 groups of equal size such that those in group 1 had the lowest yearly income in 2010 and those in group 10 had the highest yearly income. In the figure below, the numbers 1-10 indicate the groups on the scale. Below the numbers, we have reported the yearly income of the person who was in the middle of that group.
In the previous survey you reported a yearly income for 2010 of X SEK. In the figure below we have indicated where you income is located on the scale. The figure displays the text presented to the treatment group at the beginning of the second survey. The exact percentile of the respondent, based on her previously reported income, was indicated with an X on the horizontal scale.
as full redistribution (everyone receives the same income after taxes and subsidies). We let the variable Against-Redist assume the value 1 if the individual provided an answer below 5 to this question, which corresponds to demanding less redistribution than the control-group median.
Our second outcome variable, labeled Cons. Party, assumes the value 1 if a respondent reported that she would vote for the Conservative Party (Moderata Samlingspartiet) if an election were to be held that day. This party is the one most strongly associated with low levels of taxation and redistribution among the Swedish parties (cf. Petersson 1994; Pettersson-Lidbom, 2008; Oscarsson & Holmberg, 2013) .
The third outcome variable gauges the response to the following question: "Would you like to change the income taxes that we have in Sweden today, and if so in what way?" Subjects who prefer to decrease taxes were assigned the value 1 for this indicator, labeled Decrease Tax. Individuals who wanted no change or an increase were given the value 0.
We consider these three outcomes separately but also create a summary index using Against-Redist, Cons. Party, and Decrease Tax, which we label the Outcome Index. The three components of the Outcome Index have equal weight and, following Kling et al. (2007) , the index is calculated in the same way as our other index, as described in note 4. A higher value of the Outcome Index indicates preferences that are more right leaning and less in favor of redistribution. 12 The response rate of the second survey was considerably higher than that of the first. This is not surprising as the first round selects individuals willing to fill out surveys in general. Out of the first-round sample of 1,242, 1,001 individuals, or 80.5%, completed the second round. 13
III. Bias in Perceptions of Relative Income
To what extent do respondents have a biased perception of where in the income distribution they are located? We define the bias of a respondent as the difference between her actual and perceived income percentile. Figure 3 displays the distribution of bias. It is substantially skewed to the left, with a median of -18 and a mean of -16.6. This indicates that a vast majority of respondents underestimate their position: believe that they are poorer relative to other Swedes than they actually are.
In fact, 85.8% report a position in the distribution that is below their actual location, while only 12.5% report a position above. When weighting these observations by population weights, the corresponding figures are 82.4% and 15.7% respectively, indicating that this result is not driven by a selected group of individuals with certain observable characteristics who chose to respond to our survey (we cannot rule out that the sample is selected on unobservable characteristics).
If we do not allow for any error in the perceived position, only 1.7% of our sample have an unbiased view of their relative income. However, even if we permit some error, the 13 Importantly, we find no impact of the treatment on the likelihood that a person responded to the second survey, conditional on having responded to the first, as shown in online appendix table A.2. We also show, in online appendix table A.3 that the treatment and control groups are balanced with respect to a range of characteristics. pattern is similar. Sixty-eight percent of our sample underestimate their relative income by more than 10 percentage points, while only 6% overestimate their position by the same amount (63% and 8%, respectively, using population weights). This implies that out of those with an absolute bias of more than 10 percentage points, 92% exhibit a negative bias. A comparison between figure 3, which shows the bias in perceived position in the income distribution, and figure 1, which displays the bias in reported income, indicates that our results are not driven by biased beliefs about own annual income.
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Taken together, our results show that Swedes generally believe that they are relatively poorer than they actually are. This finding differs from results found in Cruces et al. (2013), Fernández-Albertos and Kuo (2015) , and Engelhardt and Wagener (2016) , who document that misperceptions about relative income are balanced among Argentinian, Spanish, and German citizens, respectively. However, our finding is in line with the bias documented in the United States. Using an American sample, Grigorieff and Roth (2016) find that 68% of the respondents underestimate their relative income, while 28% think their position is higher than it actually is. Below, we investigate potential determinants of bias in our sample.
We start by investigating if the bias differs across the income distribution. Figure 4 shows the perceived position in the income distribution in relation to the actual position. The estimated slope is 0.657, which is significantly different from 1 ( p < 0.01). Figure 4 also shows more noise and a less pronounced negative bias on average among low-income individuals (possibly because the perceived relative income percentile has a lower bound of 0).
There are several ways to test if the bias differs across subgroups. Columns 1 and 2 of table 1 present the results from regressing bias on individual characteristics. We control for indicators of actual position, so that the specification exploits variation in the perceived position only. A positive coefficient thus corresponds to a more positive value of bias (which generally implies more accurate beliefs, as most individuals underestimate their position). Two subgroups may have similar average beliefs about actual position but different variation in their beliefs. Such differences are also informative about perceptions of the income distribution. Columns 3 and 4 of table 1 repeat the analysis presented in the first two columns but replace the dependent variable with the absolute value of the bias. Table 1 paints a relatively consistent picture about differences in bias between subgroups. Subgroups that exhibit more positive bias also have less dispersed beliefs. As is evident from columns 1 and 2 of table 1, respondents with at least a college education have an average bias that is 2.6 percentage points less negative than those without college education. The same holds when considering the absolute value of bias in columns 3 and 4. Respondents with above-average cognitive ability have more precise and less dispersed beliefs than those with below-average ability; the difference in average bias corresponds to 3.7 points. Individuals who report consuming more media exhibit less bias, but whether the respondent lives in an urban area is not related to the extent of bias, although exposure to individuals from different socioeconomic groups is arguably higher in cities. No differences in bias are documented between right-ofcenter individuals and other respondents. Older individuals are worse at estimating their position in the income distribution, but neither wealth nor income is associated with bias or the absolute value of bias.
One strand of the literature has argued that the different levels of redistribution in the United States and Europe OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Columns 1 and 3 display coefficients from separate regressions for each covariate, while columns 2 and 4 include all variables in the same model. All regressions include fixed effects for each percentile of the actual relative income distribution. The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is bias, defined as perceived minus actual percentile in the income distribution. Higher values indicate overestimation of relative income. The dependent variable in columns 3 and 4 is the absolute value of bias. College is a dummy for having more than two years of postsecondary schooling. IQ is a dummy for above-median cognitive ability, as determined during military enlistment and is available only for men. Informed is a dummy for above-median usage of news. Urban is a dummy for living in one of Sweden's four metropolitan areas (Stockholm, Gothenburg, Malmo, or Uppsala). Right is a dummy for preferring one of the four right-of-center parties in Sweden in the first survey. Log Total Taxable Income and Log Net Wealth are log taxable income in 2010 and log net wealth in 2006, respectively, taken from the Swedish Tax Registries. Net wealth is logarithmized using the inverse sine function to incorporate negative values. Relative Income Growth is a dummy for being in the top 25 percentiles of growth in actual relative income between 2000 and 2010, calculated using register data. Subjective Rel. Inc. Growth is a dummy for answering that one's relative income is higher compared to ten years earlier. Subj. Future Rel. Inc. Growth is a dummy for expecting one's future relative income to be higher in ten years as compared to when the survey was taken. Income Mobility Beliefs measures disagreement with a statement about limited income mobility in society.
are not due to income inequality or social mobility per se, but to differing perceptions about inequality or mobility (cf. Benabou & Tirole, 2006) . If individuals fail to perceive the determinants of social mobility, their perceived position in the income distribution may be imperfect as well. In table 1, we test whether individuals who have experienced social mobility in the recent past are better at placing themselves in the income distribution. Those who experienced the largest relative income growth from 2000 to 2010 (top quartile of changes) have on average 2.4 percentage points less negative bias than others. This is verified in the row below, which compares bias among those who report a positive relative income growth over the past ten years to those who report no or negative growth. Even stronger in magnitude is the relation between expecting positive relative income growth over the next ten years and bias, captured by the variable Subjective Future Rel. Inc. Growth. Finally, the perception of income mobility in general terms is also strongly correlated with less negative bias, as shown in the final row. Without an objectively established metric for social mobility, our different measures do suggest that both actual and expected mobility matter for beliefs about one's position in the income distribution.
Relating these results to the canonical theoretical frameworks of Romer (1975) and Meltzer and Richard (1981) , we conclude that the implicit assumption of full and correct information about relative income does not hold. Moreover, the bias differs across groups.
IV. Correcting the Bias
We now investigate the impact of correcting inaccurate beliefs about relative income. We start by presenting average effects of the information treatment within bias categories and then proceed to exploring heterogeneous responses by bias, political opinions, and economic views. We follow Cruces et al. (2013) , and in the main analysis, respondents who underestimate (overestimate) their relative income by more than 10 percentage points are categorized as exhibiting a negative (positive) bias. As discussed in section IVC and presented in the online appendix, our results are robust to varying this cutoff. Section IVC also contains numerous other robustness. In addition, we conduct a dose-response analysis where we allow the treatment effect to vary linearly depending on the extent of bias. The results of the doseresponse analysis are discussed in section IVC, and the full analysis is presented in the online appendix. 
A. Average Effects
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Decrease Tax, as well as on the composite Outcome Index which, as described, is an equally weighted composite measure of the three outcome variables such that a higher value indicates more right-leaning and more antiredistribution preferences. The results suggest that the treatment leads to a significant shift in preferences toward the political right among those with a negative bias of more than 10 percentage points. 14 While the point estimate of the outcome index within the positive-bias group is almost as large as within the group with negative bias, only 6% of the sample has a positive bias of more than 10 percentage points, and the coefficient for this group is thus very imprecisely estimated. Column 2 shows that the treatment increases the probability of a person with a negative bias larger than 10 percentage points demanding redistribution below the median by 8.1 percentage points from a base of 35.6% in the control group-a 22.8% increase. It also increases support for the Conservative Party (column 3) by 8.1 percentage points, a relative increase of 32.2% from the control group mean. Finally, in column 4, the point estimate for the willingness to decrease taxes is positive but not significantly different from 0. 15
B. Heterogeneous Effects
As an overwhelming majority of our respondents underestimate their relative income, we continue to focus on them and explore heterogeneous responses to treatment among those who underestimate their relative income in the first survey by at least 10 percentage points. We first investigate the interaction of treatment and the support for a right-of-center party in the first survey among those who underestimate their position. Table 3 shows that within the right-of-center group, the treatment effect on the Outcome Index more than doubles in size as compared to the average effect, while the effect among the nonright is a precisely estimated 0. 16 The average treatment effects reported in table 2 thus seem to be entirely driven by the respondents with prior political preferences right-of-center.
14 The online appendix provides plots visualizing the average effect by showing the distribution of responses by treatment status. The average effect seems to be driven by responses across the distribution. 15 These results indicate that people with a negative bias larger than 10 percentage points react to treatment, whereas others do not. Note however, that the treatment effect on the Outcome Index for those with a positive bias larger than 10 percentage point is of similar magnitude (but with very large standard errors and hence statistically insignificant). A potential interpretation of this could be that these people also are affected by the information treatment and hence that this does not work only through correcting beliefs about relative income but also through, for example, increasing the saliency of relative income in general. We do not believe that this is correct, given the large standard errors and the fact that the components of the Outcome Index (studied in columns 2-4) render an ambiguous picture for people with a positive bias larger than 10 percentage points and those with an absolute bias that is smaller than 10 percentage points. This alternative interpretation of our data is discussed further in section IVC.
16 Figure A .2 in the online appendix confirms the hetoregenous responses graphically. OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. The table shows estimated heterogeneous treatment effects with respect to prior party preferences. The sample consists of those who underestimated their relative income by more than 10 percentage points. Right is a binary indicator for supporting one of the four right-of-center political parties in Sweden in the first survey (i.e., before treatment). Outcome Index is a composite measure of the outcome variables in columns 2-4; a higher value indicates more right-leaning and more antiredistribution preferences. Against-Redist is a binary indicator for demanding low levels of redistribution. Cons. Party is a binary indicator for supporting the Conservative Party. Decrease Tax is a binary indicator for wanting to decrease income taxes. Effort is a variable indicating the degree to which one believes that effort determines economic success in life. See the more detailed definitions in section II.
Columns 2 to 4 of table 3 consider each outcome variable separately. The probability of demanding low levels of redistribution increases with treatment by approximately 12 percentage points among those with right-of-center preferences. Support for the Conservative Party increases by approximately 15 percentage points upon treatment, implying a reshuffling of party allegiances among those with prior party preferences right of center. In both cases, the treatment effect in the rest of the sample is close to 0 and insignificant. The willingness to decrease taxes is not significantly affected in either group. 17 Notice that this heterogeneous treatment effect contributes to a polarization of political preferences across the political spectrum, with right-wing individuals becoming less supportive of redistributive policies and the nonright maintaining their views even when confronted with the news that they are richer than they thought they were. It is interesting to consider what would happen in a setting where most individuals instead overestimate their relative position. If our results are symmetric in the sense that respondents with prior right-of-center preferences also react more strongly to negative news about their relative position, such an information intervention might reduce the dispersion of opinions.
To understand the working of the heterogeneous treatment effect in more detail, we exploit the vast information that we hold on background characteristics and find that having right-of-center preferences in the first survey is positively correlated with age, being married, length of education, cognitive ability, income, wealth, and self-reported media consumption (see online appendix table A.4). As several of these variables also predict a lower relative income bias, OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. The table shows estimated heterogeneous treatment effects on the outcome index by prior beliefs about how the economy works. The sample consists of those who underestimated their relative income by more than 10 percentage points. Column 5 estimates the same model as column 1 but restricts the sample to those who expressed right-of-center preferences in survey 1 (i.e., before treatment), while column 6 uses only the sample of those who did not express such perferences. Outcome Index is a composite measure of the variables, Against-Redist, Cons. Party, and Decrease Tax; a higher value indicates more right-leaning and more antiredistribution preferences. Redist-Distort is a composite measure of the variables No Dist. and Luck; a higher value indicates beliefs about redistribution not being distorting. No. Dist is a binary indicator for believing that income taxes do not distort labor supply. Luck is a binary indicator for believing that luck determines economic success in life. See the more detailed definitions in section II.
we investigate the interactions between these variables and the treatment effects but find that none of the interactions between treatment, bias, and the heterogeneity of interest is statistically significant and that the heterogeneous effects of right-of-center preferences remain even when controlling simultaneously for these variables (see online appendix tables A.5-A.6).
Instead, we turn to beliefs about the workings of the economy and how economic success is generated in an attempt to understand why those with prior preferences right of center respond to being informed that they are richer than believed, while those with nonright preferences do not. Right-of-center preferences are positively correlated with the belief that individual economic success is the result of personal effort rather than luck. There is also a positive correlation between right-of-center preferences and the belief that income taxes are distorting and affecting labor supply. Table 4 reports the results from estimating separate treatment effects by prior beliefs. Columns 1 to 3 show that treated subjects on average support less redistributive policies, but that this effect is 0 for those who believe that redistribution is nondistortive and that luck is the key determinant of economic success.
These results suggest that beliefs about how the economy works play an important role in shaping the response to treatment. However, as these beliefs are correlated with right-of-center political preferences, the variation in columns 1 to 3 in table 4 may simply be a result of this correlation. In column 4, we add a control variable for right-of-center political preferences and show that the treatment effect remains significant. Restricting the sample to the respondents who reported right-of-center preferences (column 5), the effect of the interaction with beliefs disappears. Finally, we restrict the sample to those who reported nonright preferences in the first survey (column 6), and even within this group, those who believe that taxation is distortive and that effort is more important than luck respond more to treatment (although the result is only marginally statistically significant for this group).
Self-serving bias could play a role for why this heterogeneity arises. Research in sociology and political science shows that individuals tend to be very persistent in their views on the determinants of economic success (Lane, 1959; Hochschild 1986 Hochschild , 1996 Lamont, 2009) . If the positive news about relative position received by treated subjects who believe in the importance of effort reinforces their view that effort determines success, they might demand less redistribution. Evidence of such a reinforcement effect on beliefs regarding the respective importance of luck and effort can be found in column 5 in table 2. Moreover, as discussed in section I, our results support the notion of self-reinforcing relationships between beliefs and political preferences (Piketty, 1995; Alesina & Angeletos, 2005; Benabou & Tirole, 2006) .
Taken together, we conclude that informing a person that she is relatively richer than previously believed has very different effects depending on the individual's political orientation. Individuals with prior political preferences right of center, who believe that effort is conducive to economic success and who think that redistribution creates distortions, respond more strongly than individuals who do not share these views.
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
C. Robustness
All robustness tests we refer to, including more detailed information about the tests, are available in the online appendixes unless otherwise stated.
Online appendix tables A.7 and A.8 display our main specifications allowing for either a smaller or a larger error before defining a person as exhibiting a bias. Instead of setting the cutoff to 10 percentage points, tables A.7 and A.8 employ cutoffs of 5 and 15 percentage points, respectively. The average effects as well as the heterogeneities documented are statistically significant and similar in magnitude to those obtained when using the 10 percentage point cutoff.
The recipients of the first survey were chosen as a representative sample of the Swedish adult population. However, as the response rate varies across subgroups of the population, our final sample is not representative in some respects. In online appendix table A.9, we run our main specification using a weighted OLS regression applying population weights. The results are similar in terms of both magnitude and statistical significance.
Tables B.1 to B.8 in the online appendix B show that our results are robust to adding control variables, including whether a person has a college education, to our main specifications.
We define four of the Swedish parties as right of center, following previous literature. However, the political landscape is constantly changing, and the recently successful anti-immigration party, the Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna), could also be defined as a rightof-center party. We redo the relevant analysis in online appendix table A.10, classifying support for this party as having preferences for right of center and find that the results do not change. We also show that the analysis can be done using only the traditionally right-wing and left-wing parties without the results changing. This indicates that how we categorize individuals who answered that they would cast a blank vote, not vote at all, or vote for a nontraditional party politically is not important for our results.
Due to a lower response rate for party preferences in the second round of the survey, there are fewer observations in column 2 than in the other columns of table 2. To investigate a possible attrition bias, we report results from two variations of the basic models in online appendix table A.11, where we use the same specifications as in table 2 but restrict the sample to the subset with nonmissing values for party preferences. The results suggest a similar pattern as in the benchmark, but with somewhat stronger overall effects. To avoid basing our results only on those confident enough to indicate party preference in the second survey, we also report results under the assumption that those who did not respond would have cast blank votes. The results in table A.11 reveal that the effects now become stronger in magnitude and more precise, indicating that attrition may, if anything, attenuate our results toward 0.
As discussed in section IVB, the fact that we use support for the Conservative Party as one of our outcome variables can raise concerns of this being an outcome that a nonright person would never consider, thereby mechanically creating the heterogeneities that we document. In online appendix table A.12, we report results from using a continuous version of the party preferences variable, where all parties have been classified according to an election survey (Oscarsson & Holmberg, 2013) , and show that our conclusions hold. 18 We use the follow-up question that was asked immediately after the information provision in the treatment to test the possibility that individuals with different prior political preferences, different beliefs about effort determining individual economic success, or different beliefs about redistribution being distortive vary in their understanding or acknowledgment of the information given in the treatment. Online appendix table A.13 shows that neither prior political preferences nor beliefs about luck or effort are related to understanding the treatment. Believing that taxation is not distortive, however, predicts understanding the treatment better at the 10% level. Column 4 includes the three variables simultaneuously and displays the F-statistic from testing that all coefficients are 0. The null hypothesis cannot be rejected ( p = 0.18). Taking into account the signs of the coefficients, we conclude that across these characteristics, there are no systematic differences in the understanding of the treatment that can explain the heterogeneous treatment effects that we find.
It is possible that the treatment not only provides an information shock but also increases the salience of relative income. For those receiving information that they are above the median, the increased salience of relative income may increase the likelihood of reporting more right-leaning views, regardless of whether the treatment provided any new information. If so, our results would not be entirely due to the information given in the treatment. We first note that this would imply that our estimates would simultaneously be biased in two different directions since the treatment group consists of individuals who are below the median, as well as individuals above it. Online appendix table A.14 shows that there is no significant difference in the responses to treatment across these two subgroups for those who underestimated their relative income.
If our results were due to framing rather than to information, we should also expect participants exhibiting no, or just a small, bias to respond to treatment despite not receiving any new information. In online appendix part C (figures C.1 to C.2 and tables C.1 to C.6) we conduct a dose response analysis, which suggests that individuals with the smallest (i.e., most negative) bias respond most strongly to treatment, even though the point estimates are not statistically significant. In online appendix part C, we also show that our results are qualitatively robust to replacing the outcome variables with their continuous counterparts, although the estimated coefficients decrease somewhat in magnitude.
V. Conclusion
We document that almost 70% of Swedish individuals believe that they are poorer relative to others than they actually are and underestimate their rank by more than 10 percentiles. Only 6% overestimate their relative position by the same amount. Linking the survey responses to administrative records at the individual level, we find that the more educated, the cognitively able, and individuals who have experienced significant upward income mobility hold more accurate beliefs. The misperceptions that we find matter for political preferences: when provided with the correct information, subjects who learn that they are relatively richer than they thought shift their preferences to the right. This effect is entirely driven by individuals who indicated right-of-center political preferences prior to treatment.
An implication of these findings is that political outcomes could be different if individuals held correct beliefs, with the underlying bias distribution determining the direction of effects. In Sweden, the Conservative Party would benefit from correcting misperceptions, and left-wing parties would gain from information provision in countries where individuals overestimate their position. Further, correcting misinformation would increase political polarization in countries prone to understimation, while countries with overestimation would observe a closer alignment of political views. Future work should investigate the origins and the nature of misperceptions in other countries to shed further light on the effects of income information treatments on policies and electoral results.
While we find that certain characteristics are able to predict individual misperceptions about relative income, additional channels may contribute to the bias that we find. For instance, self-serving behavior may lead individuals to lower their perceived rank in order to justify subsequent selfish behavior (Di Tella et al., 2015) . Another possibility is that respondents intentionally misrepresent their relative income to avoid appearing arrogant or divulging sensitive information. Misperceptions may also arise from difficulties in estimating the income distribution. For example, individuals may not sufficiently appreciate the fraction of the distribution that consists of near-zero incomes.
The exact workings of the heterogenous effect of correct information on political preferences need further investigation. We show that beliefs about redistribution being distortive and about individual economic success being the result of effort rather than luck are more common among those with right-of-center preferences. This may imply that an individual who learns that she is richer than she thought and at the same time believes income to be generated by effort interprets the information as evidence of her having worked harder, relative to others, than she previously thought. Self-serving bias may then lead this person to believe even more strongly in the role of effort in determining success, which in turn decreases her demand for redistribution.
